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
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Intelligence Input to NSDD 250 Tasking

1. Among other things, NSDD 250 tasked the Director of Central Intelligence to assess likely Soviet and other foreign reactions to a US-Soviet agreement to do away with ballistic missiles of all ranges. The attached response was prepared by the National Intelligence Council and was reviewed by senior officers in the Defense Intelligence Agency and in CIA. I am forwarding this package to you at the direct request of Frank Carlucci.

2. The paper covers a lot of important issues; there is a short overview that I would strongly recommend to you. I want to emphasize that, although I think it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would go along with a move to eliminate ballistic missiles while retaining bombers and cruise missiles, they, in fact, would be in a much better position to take advantage of such a new regime than most people realize. These points are well documented in the paper. The Chairman, National Intelligence Council, and the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs are available to discuss the issues in this paper further with you or members of your staff.



Robert M. Gates

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:  
09-29-2008

Sec Def Conf Nr. DE

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SOVIET AND OTHER FOREIGN REACTIONS TO  
A ZERO-RALLISTIC-MISSILE WORLD

by

National Intelligence Council

January 1987

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## OVERVIEW

There are strong and compelling reasons--doctrinal, institutional, bureaucratic, personal, economic, and strategic--for the USSR to reject proposals that promise to eradicate the USSR's ballistic missile arsenal. Doctrinally, ballistic missiles occupy essential roles in supporting Soviet global ambitions and are important weapons for securing Soviet military objectives on the battlefield. From a force structure perspective, they carry well over 40 percent of the Soviet intercontinental range nuclear weapons and ambitious modernization efforts for both ICBMs and SLBMs are already underway. Moreover, the future of key military and industrial bureaucracies remains inextricably linked to ensuring the primacy of the role that ballistic missiles play in the USSR's broader game plan for extending its influence. Also, the apparent savings associated with an agreement to remove all ballistic missiles could be more than offset by the increased expenditures necessary to augment and further modernize the remaining Soviet strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, and general purpose forces. For these and other reasons, it is highly unlikely that the USSR contemplates an arms control regime with the US that would result in the removal of all US and Soviet ballistic missiles.

At the same time, however, there have been forces at play in the Soviet defense arena which would facilitate the USSR's transition to a zero ballistic missile world and that would serve them well should such an arrangement ever come about. Soviet defense decisionmakers tasked with assessing how the USSR could meet its strategic objectives in a zero-zero ballistic missile world by 1996 would undertake their work mindful that the USSR is already replacing its heavy bomber force with Blackjack and Bear H, is flight testing a variety of cruise missiles including a supersonic missile, and possesses substantial and improving air defenses, an operational ARM system, a large civil defense apparatus, and a huge deep underground shelter network designed to protect the USSR's leadership in the event of nuclear war. Moreover, they would be relatively pleased by the current conventional balance, even as they address existing and serious deficiencies in their air forces. In short, a zero-zero ballistic missile agreement would not catch the USSR fully flat-footed. And, perhaps most importantly the absence of fast-flying ballistic missiles would go a long way to resolving the principal concern of Soviet war planners: How to anticipate, avoid or handle the potentially "sudden" transition to general nuclear war from a conventional conflict in Europe that they expect to win? The elimination of all US "fast-flying" ballistic missiles would mitigate this central problem for the USSR.

While it is unclear whether in a zero ballistic missile world the risk of escalation from conventional to nuclear war would decrease, the likelihood of crises and even conventional conflict, however, could increase. (Nonetheless, war itself--even a conventional war--remains unlikely.) Overall, the elimination of ballistic missiles could reduce somewhat political stability, by increasing Soviet propensity for risk-taking, since the Soviets might judge that the probability and potency of any US response would likely be decreased in a world without ballistic missiles.

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Whatever the Soviets think about the military implications of specific arms control concepts or proposals, they are clearly and, for the moment, primarily playing a political game about which they are very serious. Achievement of Gorbachev's two principal arms control objectives--stopping SDI and deflecting the Reagan Administration from its entire national security agenda of arms buildup and counter-Soviet actions--would make the 1990s much easier for the USSR than they would otherwise be. They would facilitate the reconciliation of Soviet internal economic and social modernization with continued and possibly expanded Soviet roles as an international superpower.

In the eyes of the Soviet military planner the actual likelihood of arms control eliminating nuclear weapons, all strategic forces, or whole classes of weapons is probably so small as to be practically zero. But the Gorbachev campaign surrounding radical arms control could well promote effects such as those above--with or without agreements--and Soviet military power would gain therefrom.

Key NATO allies, especially the nuclear powers, will continue to oppose the elimination of US and Soviet ballistic missiles on the grounds that it will undermine the concept of nuclear deterrence and weaken the perceived US commitment to Western Europe's defense.

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A zero-zero ballistic missile agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would be cause for concern in Beijing--despite its longstanding call for the abolition of nuclear weapons. China would expect to come under great international pressure to accede to any US-Soviet treaty, and they would not want to be perceived internationally as dragging their feet on an historic opportunity for sharp cuts in nuclear arms. At the same time, compliance with an agreement that eliminated ballistic missiles while allowing strategic defenses and nonballistic offensive systems would nullify China's deterrent, which relies exclusively on ballistic missiles that can threaten the Soviet Union. As a result, we believe Beijing would at a minimum attempt to retain its present nuclear capability and pursue a political strategy designed to deflect international pressures to sign on.

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## THE SOVIETS IN A ZERO-BALLISTIC-MISSILE WORLD

1. Soviet foreign policy is driven by forces stemming from historical and ideological roots. Soviet national security policy seeks to promote the USSR's global objective of extending its influence either directly as in Afghanistan or through proxies such as the Sandinistas in Central America and the Cubans in Africa. Neither the arms control policies of the sixties and seventies, nor the US arms reduction agenda of the eighties, has in any appreciable way altered the Soviet world view and its Marxist-Leninist agenda. Nor is any prospective arms reduction agreement likely to alter Soviet strategic objectives, although it could change the Soviet gameplan for securing those strategic objectives; that is because the Soviets see arms control as a means for managing their program for achieving global objectives and not as a substitute for those national objectives.

### The Soviet Strategic Outlook

2. The USSR's national security decisionmakers underwrite the research, development, testing and deployment of its strategic nuclear arsenal for two principal reasons. First, as Marxist-Leninists they see a deep and abiding antagonism with the West that could well result in nuclear war--even if such a war is no longer deemed fatally inevitable. Anything short of serious war-waging capabilities would, in their view, be inadequate preparation for this contingency. Second, such forces also give the USSR superpower status with attendant foreign policy influences. Strategic nuclear weapons --principally ballistic missiles--are the most visible confirmation of Soviet superpower status; they are their primary capital when it comes to affirming the USSR's status as a co-equal with the US--a perception that is critical to their global objective of extending their influence and control. Strategic nuclear forces underpin an assertive Soviet foreign policy by projecting an image of military strength. Soviet leaders appreciate the political utility of world perceptions of military power and have long stressed the contribution of strategic forces to the USSR's superpower status. They recognize that military power is their principal foreign policy asset and that continued high levels of defense efforts, both in acquisition of forces and in research and development programs, are necessary to sustain and expand Moscow's global role.

3. Although the Soviets share the West's goal of avoiding nuclear war, the avenue they chose, early in the strategic nuclear era, for securing that goal was different than the one followed by the West. As a continental power that had long understood warfare as the art of advancing, conquering and occupying an opponent's homeland, they rejected Western concepts of mutual assured destruction (MAD) as a sound basis for strategic nuclear force planning. Instead they derisively described MAD as little more than a mutual suicide pact that they had no intention of joining. Their refusal to sign on to MAD was enduring even while their appreciation of the consequences of nuclear war matured. Throughout the seventies, while exercises featuring nuclear play became more realistic, reflecting higher and higher casualty rates, and statements by Soviet leaders increasingly touted the horrendous

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consequences of nuclear war, the USSR has continued its emphasis on the procurement of strategic weapons with warfighting attributes, and its commitment to passive and active strategic defenses designed to facilitate the survival of the leadership that would be necessary for centralized war direction and reconstitution.

4. The Soviets apparently believe that in the present US-Soviet strategic relationship each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities that could devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders have stated that nuclear war with the United States would be a catastrophe that must be avoided if possible and that they do not foresee such a conflict as inevitable. Nevertheless, they regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility. They seek superior capabilities to fight and win a nuclear war with the United States, and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing in such a conflict. A tenet of their strategic thinking holds that the better prepared the USSR is to fight in various contingencies, the more likely it is that potential enemies will be dissuaded from initiating attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies and hesitant to counter Soviet political and military actions. To this end the Soviets are developing and deploying forces that will enable them to deal flexibly with conflict contingencies in various geographic settings that differ in scope and intensity--from border skirmishes to protracted intercontinental nuclear war.

#### Sources of, and Limits to, Doctrinal Change

5. Soviet military discourse on intercontinental nuclear war--both classified and unclassified--for virtually all of the post World War II nuclear era has focused on what Soviets military theorists have described as the initial nuclear phase--the opening nuclear salvos--which they have routinely described as potentially decisive. While it is true that Soviet understanding and characterization of that initial nuclear phase has evolved over the last three decades, such evolution has come about only as the result of long and divisive doctrinal debate and has always affirmed the conclusion that the outcome of a US-Soviet nuclear war could be determined by the initial nuclear strike. This emphasis has occurred, despite their realization that even general nuclear war could become protracted, and extend over a period of weeks or months, a possibility that requires survivable nuclear assets and command and control capabilities. In essence, Soviet doctrinal discussions ultimately evolved from a belief that general nuclear war would begin with simultaneous launches of each side's entire arsenal, to allow for an initial, conventional opening war phase which over the years they have come to perceive as being of greater and greater duration and complexity. This evolution has been slow and painful.

6. Doctrinal evolution in the USSR begins with debates among military theorists, which are then followed by war games and simulations, then by testing and evaluation in field exercises--and ultimately by codification by the political military leadership of the USSR. This process can take a decade or more to run its course. And there are no short cuts on cosmic issues that affect Soviet military doctrine. This is one reason, but not the only one,

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that the Soviets have rejected, for a number of years now, what they describe as one-sided US proposals that seek to restructure the Soviet strategic arsenal. As such any new US proposal that would require radical changes in the makeup of Soviet nuclear forces will be perceived as running counter to an orthodoxy and doctrinal decisionmaking process that the Soviets describe as "scientific." The process that creates Soviet military doctrine and the resulting Soviet force structure are slow to change. The Soviets are suspicious of proposals that require radical shifts in the way their "scientific" process dictates they think; these proposals are almost sure to be rejected.

7. Soviet military doctrine's preoccupation with the initial phase of a nuclear war with the US, derived in the first instance from the tremendous destructive capability of nuclear weapons and secondly from the creation of "fast-flyers"--ballistic missiles that can strike the US or the USSR in thirty minutes or less. On the one hand the potential presented by nuclear weapons for delivering a knock-out punch argued for reliance on fast-flyers and once ballistic missiles became the leading edge of the two sides' arsenals it made the initial nuclear phase even more important in Soviet orthodoxy. The further enshrinement of the tenet which holds that the initial nuclear phase can be decisive in turn had a synergistically derived impact on the role and status of ballistic missiles.

8. In addition, ballistic missiles quickly became a symbol of Soviet power particularly on the international scene where it has become the one area in which the USSR has gained a status co-equal with the US as a superpower. Domestically, the top Soviet political leaders, until recently, were directly involved in the creation of the Soviet ballistic missile force and saw their careers prosper in direct proportion to the growth of the USSR's status as a ballistic missile power. Brzhzev, for example, began his meteoric rise to the post of General Secretary as the principal Party Secretary charged by Khrushchev with overseeing the ballistic missile industry in the early 1960s. Although such direct and personal linkage between the political leadership and the fate of the strategic ballistic missile is changing there is likely still to be a strong residue of this. Moreover, within the military structure itself the people that controlled and operated large ballistic missiles became an independent service, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and soon thereafter, the officially acknowledged senior service in all of the USSR's Armed Forces. And unlike its US counterpart, the SRF is a one-system service--it possesses only fast-flying ballistic missiles. To ban ballistic missiles means the end of what the USSR officially describes as its senior military service. The bureaucratic pressures marshalled by the SRF within the military against such a proposal would be intense. (Although there might be some in the USSR's Ground Forces from whose ranks the real leaders of the USSR's professional military establishment still come, who would see such a development as a "just reward" given the symbolic slighting this service has gotten since the 1960s). The story they would carry would resonate well with the lobbying of a defense industrial sector whose leaders--the missile designers--have been national heroes. The ballistic missile defense industry is not one that is readily convertible to other endeavors and so a ban on

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ballistic missiles would almost certainly incur hard times for important, one can say, segments of the Soviet polity.

9. Thus there are strong and compelling reasons--doctrinal, institutional, bureaucratic, personal, economic, and strategic-- for the USSR to reject proposals that promise to eradicate the USSR's ballistic missile arsenal. In fact, Soviet proposals for the elimination of all strategic offensive arms (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) was probably an attempt to keep the West "off balance" through a series of confusing indications of tough and conciliatory changes in Soviet policy. Moscow probably sees such an approach as favorable to the creation of a political atmosphere hostile to those in the West who want continuing strategic force modernization. That said, Soviet military doctrine does evolve, the USSR's strategic arsenal is on the path of diversification, there is a changing of the guard in the USSR's national security agenda and it is the USSR's global objectives which are paramount rather than the means they have adopted for reaching those ends.

### The Soviet Calculus

10. Soviet defense decisionmakers tasked with assessing how the USSR could meet its strategic objectives in a zero-zero ballistic missile world by 1996 would undertake their work mindful that the USSR is already modernizing its heavy bomber force; is flight testing cruise missiles including a supersonic variant, possesses substantial air defenses, as well as an operational ABM system, a large civil defense apparatus and a huge deep underground shelter network designed to protect the USSR's leadership in the event of nuclear war. Moreover, they would be relatively pleased by the current conventional balance even as they address existing and serious deficiencies in their air forces. In short a zero-zero ballistic missile world would not catch the USSR fully flat-footed. In particular, their conventional force dominance would hold them in good stead in such a scenario. Perhaps most importantly the absence of fast-flying ballistic missiles would go a long way to resolving the principal concern of Soviet war planners: How to anticipate, avoid or handle the transition to general nuclear war from a conventional conflict in Europe that they expect to win? The elimination of all US ballistic missiles would mitigate this central problem for the USSR. At the same time, however, Soviet planners would also have to consider:

- The extent to which an expanded Soviet bomber, tactical aircraft, and cruise missile force could assume the remaining key strategic missions in a zero-zero ballistic missile world, heretofore assigned primarily to ballistic missiles--especially ICBMs.
- Their assessment of the US ability to create a strategic defense that could significantly attrit remaining Soviet strategic assets.

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- Their confidence that the United States would not acquire a strategic advantage during or after the period of transition from a force reliant mainly on ballistic missiles to a force comprised solely of bombers and cruise missiles.
- Their perception of how difficult it would be to manage the transition to a zero ballistic missile world.
- Their ability over the next decade to produce and deploy additional heavy bombers and cruise missiles with existing production facilities and without major disruptions in industry and the economy.
- Their preference that such a proposal provide some cost savings or, at a minimum, not increase spending for defense above that programmed in the absence of an arms control agreement.
- Their ability to retain or create a covert force of ballistic missiles, especially ICBMs.
- Their assessment of the degree to which their passive and active strategic defenses in a zero-zero ballistic missile world would be enhanced.
- Their expectations concerning third country nuclear weapons development programs starting with the Chinese, British and French but also to a lesser degree, other nuclear-weapon-possessing countries.

11. A key element of the Soviet strategic force posture is the capability to preempt the enemy's use of nuclear weapons. The means for accomplishing this initially would be greatly affected by a zero ballistic missile force. The time required to employ bombers will seriously hinder Soviet capability to achieve a preemption of a US strategic strike. Force reposturing (such as placing SLCMs off the US shores) may solve part of the problem, but may not achieve their damage limitation requirements or provide timely enough response or reliable C3 connectivity with the high level of certainty specified in their war plans. Thus, at least initially, a zero ballistic missile world would leave the Soviets without the means to achieve a basic tenet of their current strategic war plans. Soviet military planners also place high priority on capabilities to destroy enemy targets under a variety of wartime conditions, including retaliation. The Soviets probably believe that elimination of ballistic missiles has the potential to jeopardize their capability to cover these targets, particularly under circumstances of retaliation; they would probably be somewhat less confident that their improved bomber force could cover these targets as well.

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### Soviet Offensive Forces Under the U.S. Proposal

12. We doubt that the Soviets would alter the basic missions of their remaining strategic nuclear offensive forces --and certainly not in the near term--even under an agreement eliminating ballistic missiles. Soviet military writers routinely emphasize the importance of rapidly destroying an opponent's warmaking capability in a strategic war. In evaluating the U.S. proposal, Soviet military planners would consider the capabilities of their bomber and cruise missile forces to meet their projected targeting requirements, particularly those requirements for the initial nuclear strike, while allowing for operational obstacles such as reliability problems, readiness factors and attrition from enemy air defenses. Soviet planning for conventional conflict in Europe would almost certainly evolve, however, since much of what constitutes Soviet tactics for conventional war in Europe is tailored to meet the possibility that the West could resort in very short order to the use of nuclear armed ballistic missiles with very short flight times. Soviet planning and forces would continue to be based on fighting and winning a conventional or nuclear war against NATO. Although the Soviets are placing more emphasis on fashioning their theater forces and operational planning to fight a protracted conventional war against NATO, their military doctrine and tactics would still be based on the realization that NATO could resort to nuclear weapons during combat. The threat of escalation to nuclear combat on the battlefield would remain present even without ballistic missiles.

13. Even in a zero-zero ballistic missile world the Soviets would still perceive the need to grapple with a complex set of time urgent targets which would still command the attention of Soviet force planners and would still magnify the importance of the initial Soviet nuclear strike; bombers on the ground, submarines in port and GLCMs in their garages are inviting targets that would be much less vulnerable to attack once deployed from home bases. For this reason the Soviets would still perceive the need for fast flyers--either supersonic, and ultimately hypersonic, cruise missiles, deployed for example in converted SSBNs off the US and European coasts, or a covert ballistic missile force. Moreover, because they would probably assume that the US would see the zero ballistic missile world from similar perspectives, they would assume a US requirement for fast-flyers; hence the spectre of a surprise first strike would likely remain a prominent concern for military planners, although it would still be our judgment that the most likely scenario for nuclear conflict is one in which the nuclear conflict grows out of a major international crisis or a conventional conflict in one or more theaters.

14. The Intelligence Community believes the Soviets expect war to begin following a period of increased tension and crisis, during which time the Soviets generate their armed forces. Also the Soviets apparently believe that a major nuclear conflict, if it occurs, would be most likely to arise out of a conventional conflict. Further, the Soviets see little likelihood that the US or NATO would launch a surprise or sudden attack from a normal peacetime posture without providing warning.

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15. As a result, we do not believe the Soviets would adopt a large-scale strip alert posture for their intercontinental bomber force. However, the Soviets may opt to place a small portion of their bomber force (a few aircraft per main operating base) on strip alert as the ballistic missiles are phased out. With the advent of the AS-15-equipped BEAR H, the Soviets have instituted a limited peacetime patrol program. Over time, as the size of the bomber force increased, so might this program. [redacted]

16. Targeting Requirements. The elimination of ballistic missiles would result in a net reduction of fixed strategic targets by about 500 from the current total of about 4,500 worldwide. The greatest change would be the elimination of about 1,200 time-urgent hardened targets--i.e., all U.S. ICBM silos and launch control facilities. This would be partially offset by additions to Soviet strategic nuclear targeting requirements.

- There would be more U.S. bases for cruise missiles--although many of these missiles probably would be based near existing ports, air bases, and ground forces installations already targeted by Soviet nuclear forces; and,
- The Soviets would anticipate an expansion of U.S. and allied air defense installations, which would pose a greater threat to attacking Soviet offensive strategic forces. [redacted]

17. The Soviets also would anticipate an increase in US GLCMs, unless these were prohibited or limited by an INF agreement, and would see a corresponding requirement to attack any GLCMs that could be located in field operating areas by Soviet reconnaissance. Barring a marked increase in the deployment of U.S. or allied GLCMs or a major breakthrough in Soviet reconnaissance capabilities, Soviet weapons requirements for attacking field-deployed missiles probably would not dramatically increase. In any case, the Soviets probably would expect that the United States would continue to deploy more ALCMs and SLCMs than GLCMs. [redacted]

18. Other Considerations for Force Sizing. In assessing their requirements for strategic forces, the Soviets would consider, in addition to the number of targets, the wartime operational obstacles to the successful delivery of weapons to targets.

- The Soviets may anticipate reliability problems with long-range land-attack cruise missiles, which incorporate new technologies.
- The Soviets probably believe that their cruise missile forces will not achieve the day-to-day readiness of their silo-based ICBM forces. Thus, many of these cruise missiles may not be available for nuclear strike operations when nuclear war begins. The Soviets would plan to generate their cruise missile forces during a period of conventional war with the United States, but they could not count on this.

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--Soviet cruise missile carriers--especially submarines--would be at least as vulnerable to attacks during a conventional phase preceding nuclear warfare as were their ballistic missile predecessors. Expected force attrition might offset planned force generation.

20. The Soviets might anticipate formidable U.S. and allied air defenses that would reduce the penetrativity of Soviet cruise missiles and cruise missile carriers. Because they probably would see US and NATO naval forces as major threats to Soviet submarines carrying SLCMs, the Soviets might allocate most of their SLCMs to targets in Eurasia, and use mostly ALCMs in attacks against North American targets. They still would be concerned, however, that U.S. and allied air defenses would intercept many Soviet cruise missiles and bombers.

20. Soviet military planners would factor in all of the above considerations in determining reserve requirements for their strategic forces. Although we cannot replicate Soviet calculations of bomber and cruise missile requirements for the end of 1996--when all ballistic missiles would be eliminated--our analysis indicates that the Soviets may require about 5,000 to 8,000 cruise missiles--assuming no upgrading of U.S. air defenses--and up to 10,000 to 17,000 cruise missiles if the United States deploys an extensive air defense system.

#### Cheating or Rapid buildup Following a Ban

21. Under an arms control agreement that would eliminate ballistic missiles during the next ten years but retain heavy bombers indefinitely thereafter, cheating must be examined separately for the two distinct periods of the agreement:

--1986-1996, during which time ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers would be allowed.

--1996 and beyond, during which time heavy bombers would be permitted, but ICBMs and SLBMs would be banned.

During the first period, cheating could take the form of Soviet deployment of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers in excess of the numbers permitted. During the second period, however, cheating could be in one of two forms--the Soviets

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could deploy excess heavy bombers and bomber weapons; or they could deploy ICBMs and SLBMs in violation of the ban on those types of systems. [redacted]

22. In the period through 1996, during which time aggregate limits would be in effect on delivery vehicles and their weapons as ballistic missiles were being reduced to zero, Soviet attempts to cheat could take any of several forms. Below are some illustrative examples, listed in order from those we can monitor with lower confidences to those we can monitor with higher confidences:

- Stockpile excess numbers of mobile ICBM launchers and missiles.
- Deploy excess numbers of mobile ICBMs.
- Convert other aircraft to perform missions of heavy bombers.
- Fail to dismantle heavy bombers.
- Stockpile excess numbers of heavy bombers.
- Deploy excess numbers of heavy bombers.
- Fail to convert SSBNs to SSNs.
- Produce new or improved systems.
- Test new or improved systems. [redacted]

23. In the period after 1996, by which time all ballistic missiles would have been reduced to zero, Soviet attempts to cheat could take any of several forms. Below are some illustrative examples, listed in order from those we can monitor with lower confidences to those we can monitor with higher confidences:

- Deploy existing bombers and their weapons in excess of the numbers permitted.
- Deploy new bombers and their weapons in excess of the numbers permitted.
- Store ICBMs under the guise of space-launch vehicles.
- Retain road-mobile ICBMs.
- Retain rail-mobile ICBMs.
- Retain SLBMs in SSBNs.
- Retain ICBMs in silos.

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--Test, produce, or deploy any ballistic missile systems that had existed prior to elimination.

--Create new ballistic missile systems. [redacted]

24. We judge that after ballistic missiles were eliminated, the prospects of Soviet cheating are clearly larger in the area of mobile missiles, both road-mobile and rail-mobile. We assume that any Soviet cheating would be done for a military reason and would be sufficient to meet specific military requirements. In a zero ballistic missile world, the Soviets would consider US C3 assets, US bomber airfields and ports, and nations possessing nuclear weapons (other than the US) as primary targets that a covert ballistic missile force could be applied against. We assume that cheating could be done using either the 10-RV SS-X-24 rail-mobile system and/or the 1-RV or 3-RV SS-25-class road-mobile system, although for a given number of total RVs the higher deployment level and attendant infrastructure necessary in an SS-25-class force would be more susceptible to detection. (In the discussion below we use the example of the SS-X-24 rail-mobile system with 10 RVs.) Soviet cheating with covert ballistic missiles could be of two basic variants. One option would be to maintain a covert force in cold storage and generate it at the appropriate time. [redacted]

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32. Another issue is the Soviet capability to rebuild a significant ballistic missile force following the arrival of the two sides at a complete ban by 1996. If the Soviets were able to maintain some key production

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facilities and test capabilities--for instance, under the guise of supporting their space program--in addition to their design bureau teams, then the potential would exist for reintroduction of a force of at least several hundred ballistic missiles in a matter of several years. The Soviets would probably be able to introduce such forces considerably quicker than the United States; it is uncertain whether they could outpace U.S. defensive deployments designed to keep up with such a possibility. [redacted]

33. The Soviets also would pursue new technologies to field such systems as hypersonic cruise missiles and low-flying terrain avoidance vehicles with stealth technology. Over the long run, they might believe that these systems--which would be allowed under the U.S. START proposal--would provide a better basis for delivering prompt or surprise attacks against U.S. offensive strategic forces. [redacted]

Soviet Assessment of Effectiveness of U.S. Air Defenses

34. Perhaps the key element in Soviet calculations of their requirements for strategic weapons under an agreement eliminating ballistic missiles would be their assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. and allied air defenses. We have little information on Soviet estimates of potential U.S. continental air defenses. Soviet writings have reflected little concern over U.S. air defenses, largely because since the early 1960s the United States has placed little emphasis on defending North America from attacks by what for many years was a declining Soviet strategic bomber threat. The Soviets are well aware, however, of the considerable emphasis assigned by the U.S. military to air defense of tactical military targets such as aircraft carrier battle groups and army troop formations. Soviet military writings and exercises demonstrate considerable respect for the ability of U.S. air defense systems to defend such targets. [redacted]

35. The Soviets probably expect that the United States could design and begin to deploy an impressive air defense network for North America by adapting technology and many of the systems involved in:

- the Aegis and Patriot phased-array, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems;
- the AWACS aircraft;
- the Phoenix long-range air-to-air missile;
- the F-14 and F-15 interceptor aircraft.

These systems, in Soviet eyes, are technically superior to similar systems in the USSR such as the SA-10 SAM and the Foxhound and Flanker interceptors. In addition, the Soviets probably judge that the U.S. would be able to use forward basing for AWACS and interceptor aircraft in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Iceland and Norway. The use of bases in these areas would give the United States some capability to intercept Soviet bombers before they could launch their cruise missiles. The Soviets, therefore, probably would believe

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that their ability to launch an effective bomber/ALCM strike against North America would depend largely on their ability to destroy a significant portion of any forward-based defensive systems prior to escalation to intercontinental war. Although the Soviets could not be sure that such defenses would ever be fielded, a worst-case Soviet scenario in which U.S. forward-based air defenses remained largely intact, probably would envisage significant attrition--perhaps as high as 50 percent--to the initial Soviet attacking force.

#### Soviet Defensive Systems

36. Air Defense. The Soviets would also be concerned that US planning to develop and deploy the Strategic Defense Initiative would mask plans for a system that could counter not only ballistic missiles but the full range of the Soviet aerodynamic threat. Indeed they would probably be even more concerned about the military effectiveness of an SDI system in a world without Soviet and US ballistic missiles than they would in a world unconstrained by arms control. Thus they would have to factor in substantial attrition factors in building their aerodynamic force for the late 1990s.

37. Soviet Defensive Systems. Soviet military planners almost certainly would argue for increased investment in strategic air defense to protect their homeland assets from the enhanced airborne nuclear attack capabilities they would project for the US. The Soviets have traditionally pursued three methods to defend their homeland:

- Preemptive attacks on U.S. and allied nuclear forces;
- Active defenses to intercept and destroy U.S. and allied missiles and aircraft in flight;
- Passive defenses (hardening and dispersal) to negate the effects of arriving U.S. and allied nuclear weapons.

In an environment without ballistic missiles, the Soviets probably would judge that the relative effectiveness of these three methods would change. The slow speed and uncertain penetration ability of cruise missiles make these systems poor replacements for ICBMs assigned the mission of destroying and disrupting a U.S. and allied nuclear attack. Thus, they would have to assume they would have to face a large, coordinated bomber and cruise missile attack. The Soviets might believe that passive defenses, combined concentrated air defenses and denial of U.S. and allied wartime reconnaissance, could provide survivability for selected homeland assets. At the very least, the Soviets would expect more assets would survive longer into the nuclear war (unless the United States fielded hypersonic cruise missiles) than they would if targeted by ballistic missiles. As far as air defense effectiveness is concerned, the absence of US ballistic missile attacks to accomplish defense suppression would leave the Soviet air defenses relatively undegraded prior to their engagement of the aerodynamic attack.

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38. On the other hand, Soviet planners would see any prospective U.S. strategic aerodynamic force as placing great technological and numerical demands on their air defenses. Soviet [redacted] writings in the 1980s consistently state that U.S. ALCMs and SLCMs will be exceedingly difficult to destroy. The Soviets probably believe that the deployment of U.S. ALCMs with stealth technology will make it even more difficult for them to detect cruise missiles once they have been launched. Overall, Soviet planners probably would not be sanguine about their ability to prevent large numbers of U.S. cruise missiles from reaching their targets. [redacted]

39. The Soviets will continue to make substantial investments in strategic air defenses. The lowest force projections for strategic defenses in the latest National Intelligence Estimate--which would include the addition of 200 strategic SAM battalions and 1,400 new interceptor aircraft (to replace larger numbers of older systems)--would require roughly 40 billion rubles for procurement over the next decade. The Soviets almost certainly would invest substantially larger sums on air defenses, particularly in the face of an enhanced US aerodynamic threat but such increases would ultimately depend on their assessment of the extent to which these increases in investment would improve the effectiveness against U.S. bomber and cruise missile forces. [redacted]

40. A Soviet move toward a zero-zero ballistic missile environment probably would result over the next decade in at least a halt in the projected modest decline of the size of the air defense forces, if not some overall growth. The US Intelligence Community, in observing the historical long-term gradual decline in interceptors, has projected that Soviet SAM and interceptor totals would decline by five to 15 percent over this period. (The overall capability would significantly increase, as the new systems are much more capable than those being replaced.) The Soviets, however, could halt this numerical decline by decreasing their retirement of old systems and increasing production of new systems such as the Foxhound, Flanker, and Fulcrum interceptors and the SA-10 SAM. Slowing retirements of old systems would be the easiest course for the Soviets, but such a move probably would require them to develop more modification programs for existing systems. They have done so for the Flogger interceptor, and the large number of mid-1960s-vintage Flagnons currently operational could make this venerable interceptor a candidate for updating. The Soviets also apparently are improving their ability to deploy more SA-10s than we currently project by adding new calibration lines at their SA-10 checkout facility. Similar increases in new interceptor deliveries would be more difficult and probably could be accomplished only by reducing other aircraft production, by reducing fighter exports, or by adopting some combination of the two. Using a combination of measures, the Soviets most likely could increase the size of their interceptor and SAM forces by some 20 to 25 percent by 1996. [redacted]

41. Such a force build-up probably would be accompanied by increases in support forces; AHACS aircraft and tankers would be especially in high demand. We currently project that the Soviets would need approximately 30-50 Mainstay AWACS aircraft to support a mid-1990s force. An increased air

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defense force could easily double this requirement. Although such an effort probably would exacerbate current production problems with the Mainstay, increased deployments would release the Soviets from having to find the large numbers of additional ground-based radars that, because of line-of-sight considerations and performance limitations, would be required to eliminate significant gaps in tracking low-observable targets at low altitude. Moreover, the Soviets will undoubtedly provide air-to-air refueling for some of their new fighters. They might see the need to dedicate some 100 to 150 tankers--in addition to the tankers required by their enhanced bomber force--to support the fighters and air-refuelable AWACS aircraft during operations out away from Soviet territory. These long-range intercepts would be a desirable improvement in Soviet air defense operations as the Soviets attempted to intercept IIS aircraft prior to their launching of cruise missiles. Another means to extend their air defense coverage forward during a conflict would be the establishment of forward air defense bases in occupied territory, such as in Scandinavia or key northern islands, such as Spitzbergen.

42. Longer term efforts that could result in significant new systems deployments in the late 1990s and beyond include:

- The development of new interceptors capable of unrefueled operations in excess of 2,000 km from Soviet territory to engage cruise missile carriers;
- The development of a long-range SAM, as a replacement for the SA-5, with the capability to engage bomber-sized targets at a range of 400 to 800 km.
- The development of ground-based and airborne high-energy laser weapons;
- The real-time integration of early warning radars with high-speed computers to allow processing of intermittent tracking data from several radars. (Such a capability could prove useful in tracking low-observable targets).
- Radar over-the-horizon radars designed to detect low-observable penetrators;
- Space-based electro-optical and radar detection systems eventually, to track bombers and cruise missiles throughout their flight.
- Space-based kill weapons to use the early warning data from long-range detection systems for kills against aerodynamic targets far from Soviet territory.

We know that the Soviets are working on some of these developments, such as laser weapons. Many of these developments would require Soviet advances in technologies that are likely to be most challenging for the Soviets. These would include computers and microelectronics and a variety of sensor

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technologies. In many regards, the US SDI program is intended to advance the "state-of-the-art" in the same areas. The Soviets probably would look at a competition advanced air defense technologies in the same light as they see the SDI challenge. [redacted]

43. Other defenses. Overall, we judge that the Soviets would feel that their longstanding commitment to conventional strategic air defenses would give them a net advantage in this area, as compared to the US, in coping with the transition to a zero ballistic missile world. Despite their healthy respect for US technological prowess, the existing Soviet nationwide air defense system would mean fewer institutional and budgetary headaches in the transition phase than they would expect the US to have to deal with. Their biggest problem would be the nature and pace of air defense modernization, and the ability to make the operational and organizational changes necessary in order to get the full advantage the improvements offer. [redacted]

44. We judge that the Soviets would attempt to preserve the ABM Treaty and forego investments in an expanded ABM defense in favor of investment in other military forces or in the economy. The Soviets, in preparing for the possibility of a US breakout from a zero-zero ballistic missile environment, would continue to develop ground-based ABMs and directed energy weapons. Such developments could include interceptors with sufficient accuracy to use nonnuclear warheads, and radars with improved capabilities to discriminate real targets from decoys and chaff, and improved battle management capabilities. These developments could be incorporated into the Moscow ABM defense, a deployment that the Soviets would continue to maintain, especially should other countries--particularly the People's Republic of China--maintain ballistic missiles, and would also provide the basis for an ABM system suitable for more widespread ABM defenses. The Soviets probably would conduct these development efforts in a manner that they would present as fully consistent with a strict interpretation of the 1972 Treaty, and any visible research in space-based ABMs probably would be restricted to basic laboratory work or would be ambiguous and thus interpretable as for ASAT. [redacted]

45. We would not expect to see any significant changes in Soviet passive defense development since air-delivered nuclear weapons would not seem to affect passive defense any differently than those from ballistic missiles. They are likely to continue their leadership protection program, including deep underground facilities--a program that has been steady for nearly 40 years. The Soviets are likely to continue their civil defense shelter effort at a level that would keep pace with population growth. This program currently is capable of sheltering approximately 11 percent of the Soviet urban population and this portion should grow by a percent or two over the next decade. Other civil defense programs such as the evacuation effort are not expected to change appreciably. [redacted]

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46. Soviet Perceptions of the US Aerodynamic Threat. The Soviets have a healthy respect for U.S. technological prowess, one that creates substantial concern about the current force of bomber and cruise missiles now in the U.S. inventory and one which is likely to cause Soviet planners to project substantial technological advantages for follow-on systems in the next ten years. In contrast, the designers of Soviet strategic aerodynamic systems appeared for many years to have fallen into relatively low repute, although in the last five years we have seen a major effort to modernize the intercontinental bomber fleet and develop long-range cruise missiles. Soviet national security planners are unlikely to believe that, left to their own devices, these designers could compete with their Western counterparts. The substantial Soviet ability through espionage to even up this disparity notwithstanding, Soviet planners would be wary of a U.S.-Soviet competition dominated by aerodynamic threats. The technological disparity would dictate resort to the time-honored Soviet approach of balancing reliance on technologically inferior forces by deploying a quantitatively superior arsenal in areas not constrained by any existing arms control sublimits, and making extensive use of active and passive defenses. Moreover, the lesser technological capability of the Soviet aerodynamic force is of much less significance so long as the United States does not deploy a major homeland air defense.

#### Projected Future Soviet Forces

47. Strategic Offensive Systems. The Soviets would evaluate the U.S. proposal in light of the leeway it would provide them to shift their offensive forces towards bombers at a measured pace that minimized dislocations in the economy and disruptions in their defense industrial base. In moving to an all-bomber and cruise missile force the Soviets also would have to factor in other considerations such as:

--Their possible objective of maintaining the maximum number of ballistic missile warheads allowed during the transition period. This objective, however, could limit their ability to deploy bombers and ALCMs especially if all Bear H and Blackjack are counted as ALCM-equipped aircraft. For example, if they retained 4,800 ballistic missile warheads in 1991--the maximum allowed--to stay within the 6,000-warhead limit, they could deploy only 1,200 accountable ALCMs and bomber weapons. However, if the Soviets slowed deployments of Bear H and Blackjack ALCM-carriers before 1991 to keep their accountable ALCMs from exceeding 1,200 in 1991 they probably could not produce enough bombers after 1991 to approach the 6,000 ALCM limit in 1996--unless they chose to bring new bomber production facilities on line after 1991.

--The Soviets also would be sensitive to the pace at which the United States was shifting its forces toward bombers, in order to ensure that the United States did not gain an advantage in ballistic missiles during the transition period.

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48. Table 1 illustrates potential Soviet forces that could result from an agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles by 1996. Some of the key assumptions of this force are:

- The Soviets retain all 1,650 accountable SS-18 warheads allowed in 1991.
- The Soviets retain slightly fewer than the 3,300 ICBM warheads and 4,000 ballistic missile warheads allowed in 1991 in order to proceed more reasonably with their bomber and ALCM programs.
- Most of the ballistic missiles retained are on newer MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs--this would result in a force with far fewer SNVs than the 1,600 allowed.
- All Bear H and Blackjack bombers are capable of carrying ALCMs and are counted as such. All Blackjacks are counted as carrying 12 ALCMs, although some may be configured with payloads of bombs and SRAMs rather than ALCMs. Bear H aircraft are deployed with only 6 ALCMs (carried internally) until the mid-1990s in order to minimize the number of accountable ALCMs and allow the Soviets to retain more ballistic missile warheads. During the mid-1990s these aircraft are deployed with an additional six ALCMs (carried externally), for a total of 12.
- The Soviets do not deploy a new strategic heavy bomber until after 1996. Beginning in the early 1990s, they deploy cruise missiles with some use of stealth technology. During the mid-1990s they deploy improved versions of the Blackjack incorporating some stealth technology, air-to-air missiles and improved electronic countermeasures equipment. This new aircraft might not be tested with ALCMs, in order to count as having only one bomber weapon.

49. The forces in Table 1 are consistent with our estimate of production capacity for Soviet weapons systems. We estimate that the Soviets could produce some 450 to 500 Bear H and Blackjack aircraft by 1996, at the expense of other aircraft programs, using production capacity that is either readily available or convertible in one to two years.

- We estimate that if the Soviets forego production of Backfire medium bombers and Classic transport aircraft and devote all of the resources at the Kazan airframe plant to the Blackjack program they could produce about 30 Blackjack per year by the early-to-mid-1990s.
- Similarly, we judge that if the Soviets were willing to forego the production of Bear F aircraft for the Navy they could convert the Taganrog airframe plant to produce the Bear H. Combined with production of Bear H aircraft at the Kuybyshev facility, this would enable the Soviets to produce about 36 of these aircraft per year by the early 1990s.

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TABLE 1

Potential Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces  
(November 1985 US START Proposal)

System	Nov 1986 SMDVs/Weapons	Dec 1991 SMDVs/Weapons	Dec 1996 SMDVs/Weapons
SS-18 (10-14 RVs)(a)	308/3080	165/1650	-- --
SS-25 class (mob) (1 RV)	72/ 72	-- --	-- --
SS-11 (1 RV)	448/ 448	90/ 90	-- --
SS-13 (1 RV)	60/ 60	-- --	-- --
SS-17 (4 RVs)	150/ 600	-- --	-- --
SS-19 (6 RVs)	360/2160	210/1260	-- --
ICBMs	1398/6490 (a)	465/3000 (a)	-- --
SS-N-6/Y-I (1 RV)	272/ 272	-- --	-- --
SS-N-17/Y-II (1 RV)	12/ 12	-- --	-- --
SS-N-8/D-I, D-II, G/H-III (1 RV)	292/ 292	118/ 112	-- --
SS-N-18/D-III (7 RVs)	224/1568	-- --	-- --
SS-N-23/D-IV, D-III (4-10 RVs) (b)	48/ 192	96/ 384	-- --
SS-N-20 class Typhoon (10 RVs)	80/ 800	100/1000	-- --
SLBMs	928/3136 (b)	308/1496 (b)	-- --
Bear H (6-12 ALCMs) (6-12 ALCMs) (c)	59/ 354	80/ 480	220/2640
Blackjack (12 ALCMs) (d)	6/ 32	85/1020	230/2760
Bear A/B/C/G (e) (bombs & ASMs)	100/ 100	-- --	-- --
Bison bombers (e)	20/ 20	-- --	-- --
Bombers	183/ 546 (e)	165/1500	450/5400

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TABLE 1 CONTINUED

SRMDVs	2511	938	450
Ballistic Missile RVs	9556	4496	--
(Accountable) (a) (b)			
ALCMs & bomber weapons	546	1500	5400
(c)			
SLCMs (not accountable under this agreement) (f)	--	1000	1750
INF missiles: (g)			
SS-20-class	441/1323	33/ 99	-- --
GLCMs	-- --	-- --	100/ 100

(a) ICBM weapons totals are for accountable RVs. It is assumed that the SS-18 is tested with no more than 10 RVs and is counted as having 10 RVs, although we judge that this missile is capable of carrying as many as many as 14 RVs. If all SS-18 ICBMs were deployed with 14 RVs, the totals for ICBM and ballistic missile RVs shown here would increase by about 1200 RVs in 1986 and 600 RVs in 1991.

(b) The SS-N-23 is assumed to be counted with 4 RVs--the number a Soviet official at Geneva has claimed has been tested with this system. We believe that the SS-N-23 is deployed with 10 RVs. If this system is counted as having 10 RVs, the totals for SLBM and ballistic missile RVs shown here would increase by 288 RVs in 1986 and 576 RVs in 1991.

(c) It is assumed here that the Soviets would continue to deploy the Bear H only with six AS-15-class ALCMs (mounted internally) through 1991 in order to minimize their accountable ALCMs and leave room for the maximum number of ballistic missile RVs. We believe that the Bear H is capable of carrying an additional six of these ALCMs mounted externally. It is assumed that after 1991 the Soviets equip the Bear Hs with 12 AS-15 ALCMs and that all of these aircraft are then counted as carrying 12 ALCMs.

(d) The totals shown here assume that each Blackjack carries 12 ALCMs, although we estimate that some of these aircraft probably will carry a mix of bombs and SRAMs rather than ALCMs.

(e) Under the proposed counting rules, aircraft equipped only with bombs would be counted as deployed with one weapon each. We estimate that a total of about 350 bombs and ASMs currently are carried on older Bear and Bison bombers.

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TABLE 1 CONTINUED

- (f) Under an agreement calling for the elimination of all ballistic missiles, the Soviets probably would place a major emphasis on the deployment of long-range SLCMs. The figures shown here assume that they deploy SS-NX-21 class SLCMs on Victor, NO2AA, Akula, and Sierra submarines, and on converted Yankee and Delta SSBNs that would have their SLEM launchers dismantled under such an agreement. [redacted]
- (g) The forces depicted here assume that a separate INF agreement limits the Soviets to 100 warheads on INF missiles in Asia and that ballistic missiles are eliminated in 1996. [redacted]

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50. The Soviets might consider converting other large airframe plants--such as the one at Ulyanovsk that currently is producing the An-24 Condor transport aircraft--to produce heavy bombers. Such conversions, however, would take years to accomplish and would reduce the Soviets' ability to produce transport aircraft. [redacted]

51. The Soviets probably would not be constrained by a shortage of capacity to produce cruise missile airframes. Two production plants currently are in operation and the Soviets could bring on-line additional plants--they might convert plants that formerly produced ballistic missiles. They might face a bottleneck, however, in the production of guidance components--for example the terrain mapping radar. [redacted]

52. Deploying a force of 450 bombers--a force about two and one-half times the size of the current force--would require a significant investment in infrastructure. The Soviets would have to construct a number of new airfields, or enlarge existing airfields to support bombers, and procure additional communications, maintenance and ground support equipment. Such a force probably also would require a large number of Mides tanker aircraft--perhaps as many as 450, compared to our current estimate for the mid-1990s of 100-180 to support both bomber and air defense needs. In order to produce this number of tankers--which use the IL-76 airframe--the Soviets would have to stop producing transport and AWACS aircraft using this airframe. (But we judge they would, if anything, produce more AWACS.) In addition, the Soviets would have to train hundreds of additional crews, as well as additional mechanics and technicians. [redacted]

53. In the absence of any limits on long-range SLCMs, we judge that the Soviets also would place a major emphasis on the deployment of these systems. It is difficult to predict the classes of submarines (and the loadings of these submarines) that would be deployed with SLCMs. Candidates for the SS-NX-21-class would be Victor-class, 402AA, Akula, and Sierra submarines. Yankee and Delta ballistic missile submarines that would have their SLBM launchers dismantled under such an agreement could also be converted as cruise missile carriers. (The 402AA is a converted Yankee.) We estimate that larger, supersonic SS-NX-24-class SLCMs would be deployed on a new class of submarine, and thus the number of these SLCMs is constrained by the submarine production rate. In sum, we judge that under the U.S. proposal, the Soviets might deploy some 1,700 to 2,000 long-range SLCMs by the end of 1996, compared to the 400 to 600 we normally project for the mid-1990s. About half of these would be SS-NX-21-class SLCMs deployed on converted Yankee and Delta SSBNs. (We judge that the Soviets could convert about four of these submarines per year). We estimate the Soviets could maintain a continual deployment of some 200 SLCMs off the U.S. coasts by the early 1990s. However, the Soviets would regard such a forward deployed force as vulnerable during a conventional phase of conflict and the Soviets could not rely on having these units available as a first-strike force. [redacted]

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54. The force in Table 1 assumes that an INF agreement limits the Soviets to 100 warheads on INF missiles in Asia--with no ballistic missiles (only GLCMs) in 1996. In the absence of an INF agreement limiting GLCMs, the Soviets probably would deploy a force of some 500 to 1,000 GLCMs. These systems would replace SS-20 IRBMs aimed at targets in Europe and Asia.

55. This force in Table 1 assumes that the Soviets do not deploy new ballistic missile systems during the period of reductions. The force in Table 1 also assumes that the Soviets choose not to deploy the new Delta-type SSBN with SS-N-23 follow-on SLBMs, which would have to be dismantled by 1996 and thus would have very short lifetimes.

56. The procurement of the bomber and cruise missile-oriented force depicted in Table 1 would require about 45 billion rubles (in 1982 prices) over the next ten years--a figure substantially less than the roughly 70 billion rubles we estimate they would allocate to their triad of ICBM, SLBM and bomber forces in the absence of such an arms control agreement. Seventy billion rubles is also what we estimate the Soviets allocated to the procurement of these forces over the past decade. This apparent savings would be offset by the increased expenditures necessary to augment and further modernize Soviet strategic defenses; most importantly, however, would be the impact of any increased expenditures on general purpose forces. Moreover, much of the apparent savings is illusory, since significant inefficiencies and downtime would occur in a conversion of ballistic missile facilities to other military or civilian functions.

57. Tactical Forces. In a ballistic missile-free environment, the Soviets would put more emphasis on their air forces--and probably short-range cruise missiles--to perform the operational role now assigned to short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). In recent years, SRBMs have assumed an increased role in Soviet military planning against NATO, especially in conventional fire support missions. The advent of new, accurate systems--such as the SS-21 and SS-23--equipped with improved conventional munition warheads, has enabled the Soviets for the first time to plan conventional SRBM strikes against a range of NATO targets with a high degree of confidence. In nuclear or conventional

<sup>1</sup> Site-based SS-X-24 class missiles would be the only new Soviet ICBMs now under allowed by the U.S. proposal--and these would compete with the heavy ICBMs under the proposal's subcapping on warheads on heavy ICBMs and ICBMs with more than six warheads. The ban on mobile systems and new or modernized heavy ICBMs would eliminate the rail-mobile version of the SS-X-24, mobile SS-25-class missiles and the SS-18 follow-on.

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operations, SRBMs are an integral part of Soviet operational planning, and planned missions include striking heavily defended targets, opening corridors through NATO air defenses, and engaging time sensitive targets.

58. Ground Forces. There are two different views of how ZBM would affect Soviet ground forces:

--CIA view: CIA does not see the elimination of ballistic missiles causing a radical departure in Soviet ground force equipment modernization or force structure trends. The Soviets' strategy for employing these forces and the traditionally large role played by ground forces in combined-arms operations is expected to remain largely unchanged. The Soviets may establish a few additional low-strength motorized rifle and tank divisions in the western USSR, but we do not foresee a significant increase in the peacetime readiness posture of the ground forces, or any increase in the number of divisions stationed in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Soviets probably would not attempt to expedite significantly the relatively lengthy R&D process associated with the development and introduction of major items of ground force equipment, a cycle which now is typically measured between five to ten years. It is likely, however, that to the extent the USSR believes NATO will react to a ballistic missile-free situation by increasing tactical air forces, the Soviets will undertake a program to increase the number and technical capabilities of their already well-developed air defense assets.

--DIA View: In a nonnuclear ballistic missile-free environment, DIA would expect to continue to see the ground forces as the dominant force in the theater war, and thus would expect to see significant changes to the methods in which these forces are employed and to the rate at which modernization will occur. Beyond our current forecasts, however, DIA would not expect any extraordinarily high increases in combat arms equipment deployments or force structure expansions (although more emphasis would probably be given to air defense modernization--above and beyond the already high priority it now receives). Operationally, the Soviets can be expected to take steps to optimize the employment of their advantage in mass and firepower as a result of NATO's loss of strike assets such as Lance and Pershing II, and their follow-on systems.

--Although DIA does not foresee a change in doctrine, DIA anticipates a significant enhancement in the role of the ground force in a combined arms operation. Specifically, the ground forces will be exposed to a diminished threat which will allow more effective employment. However, DIA does not expect the Soviets to increase their combat arms force structure above what is currently projected. The absence of ballistic missiles reduces the threat to vital facilities supporting the movement of forces behind the FEBA and from the USSR to ACE and possibly in the future the forces themselves. As a result, marked operational advantages accrue to the Soviets to maximize their already considerable

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lead in mass. They will continue to devote assets to countering NATO conventional deep-strike systems which they also believe pose a severe threat to their forward deployment capability. Another area this could be reflected in would be the initiation of hostilities. The Soviets have had to consider the impact of NATO ballistic missiles on the forward movement of Western MD forces. Presently, they plan the movement of these forces prior to the opening of war. Among the reasons for doing so is to minimize superiority in the long range attack. The reduction of this threat may allow the Soviets to consider movement after initiation of hostilities which reduces NATO warning creating a more unstable environment. [redacted]

--The Soviets are likely to believe that NATO will react to a ballistic free situation by increasing fixed wing assets to replace SRBMs in its war plans. The Soviets likely would counter this enlarged threat by increasing their already highly capable and well-developed air defense assets. In addition, the Soviets will be able to devote increased assets to an already high-priority effort to defend against cruise missiles. [redacted]

59. The role currently played by SRBMs in Soviet operational planning cannot be readily fulfilled by any other existing ground forces weapon system. Large-caliber, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) and cannons might be able to assume certain close-in nuclear fire support missions, but their restricted range of less than 40 kilometers would limit such a substitution scheme. One obvious candidate to compensate for the loss of ballistic missiles would be a short-range ground-launched cruise missile, and we believe that the Soviets would place more emphasis on cruise missile development under these circumstances. Another possibility is a long range multiple rocket launcher. [redacted]

60. Air Forces. Elimination of SRBMs would increase considerably the operational responsibility of the already strained Soviet air forces.

--A larger portion of the air forces would probably be withheld in readiness for nuclear operations.

--The air forces would assume the entire burden of conventional strikes beyond the range of cannons, MRLs, and attack helicopters.

Although the elimination of US and NATO ballistic missiles would relieve the air forces of many high priority targets, this probably would be offset by the requirement to attack heavily-defended targets currently assigned to SRBMs. [redacted]

61. In response to expanded operational requirements, the Soviets would likely increase the overall size of the air force by keeping older aircraft in the inventory longer, and by increasing the production of newer aircraft. The Soviets also see themselves at a technological disadvantage in the development and production of advanced combat aircraft, however, and to increase the

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development or production of such aircraft would require large new investments. The most likely response at least in the short-term would, therefore, be a modest increase in the size of the existing force using older and contemporary aircraft.

62. Naval Forces. Because of the impact of long lead time procurement of major subsystems for warships, force changes will probably take longer to be realized in naval forces than in other forces. As a result of ceasing SSBN production, the Soviets could increase their SSN production rate from the current 3-4 per year to upwards of six per year in addition to the SSBN conversion program discussed earlier. In other submarine-related developments, we would expect the USSR to vigorously pursue development of a long-range (500-600 km) torpedo tube-fired antiship weapon to allow the broadest range of their SSN force (such as VICTORS) to participate in the increasingly important anti-ship warfare tasks, particularly as more US ships are equipped with land attack cruise missiles. Furthermore, the Soviet SSN force would be able to be more fully applied to open ocean tasks because it would no longer be encumbered by the requirement to protect SSBNs in the bastion areas.

63. Although the elimination of SLBMs would reduce the USSR's need for strategic submarine bastions, the Soviet requirement for echeloned defense in depth at sea would increase to counter heightened enemy SLCM/ALCM threats. Thus, many Soviet general purpose naval forces, released from pro-SSBN defense, would shift to anti-SLCM/ALCM roles in expanded sea control and sea denial areas. Since SLCM submarines must approach their targets more closely than SSBNs to be within effective weapons release range, the Soviet strategic ASW problem would contract from forward areas to primarily the Norwegian Sea and Northwest Pacific. This would also cause the Soviets to concentrate naval air defense forces in these areas.

#### Soviet Assessment of Third Country Nuclear Systems

64. Lastly, the Soviets would add to their calculus their assessment of third country nuclear developments especially for British, French, Chinese and other ballistic missile possessing nations. The Soviets assess the adequacy of their strategic nuclear force against the combined nuclear forces of all their potential enemies--an approach consistent with the way military planning has been carried out in Russia, even in Czarist times. The Soviets have a keen appreciation of British and French strategic nuclear force planning and at least a sound appreciation of Chinese nuclear capabilities. We are less certain of Soviet understanding of Indian, Pakistani, and other third country nuclear programs but they are highly unlikely to project any substantial short, or especially long-range ballistic threat from these countries before the year 2000.

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65. The substantial growth planned for British and French strategic nuclear forces--particularly in SLBMs and IRBMs--is of real concern to the USSR. The Soviets are unlikely to ever contemplate going to zero ballistic missiles while the British, French and Chinese remain outside such an agreement. Force planners assessing a US-Soviet zero ballistic missile regime would add these and other third country nuclear capabilities to the missions that remaining Soviet forces would have to offset. [redacted]

The Gorbachev Arms Control Agenda

66. The latest Soviet START proposal calls for mutual reductions to 6,000 weapons by 1991 and the complete elimination of offensive strategic weapons by 1996. While the proposed elimination of all offensive strategic weapons was undoubtedly intended in large part to help them seize the high ground politically, the Soviets probably regard the proposal for an interim reduction to 6,000 weapons as a possible basis for a future arms control agreement. The proposal they tabled in October 1985 also called for reductions to 6,000 weapons. [redacted]

67. The Soviets perceive that IIS weapon programs threaten to erode the USSR's hard-won strategic position. They probably judge that their proposed reductions to 6,000 weapons--which they have made contingent on the US not going ahead with SDI--would constrain US offensive modernization programs severely. Our analysis of Soviet targeting requirements indicates that such reductions would make sound military sense. Under deep reductions for both sides, the Soviets would be able to meet critical strategic missions in either a preemptive or retaliatory strike as well as they can today. Also, the US threat would be more manageable for Moscow if there were a substantially smaller US force. [redacted]

68. Nevertheless, the Soviet decision to counter the IIS zero ballistic missile proposal with a call for the abolition of all nuclear weapons--such a sweeping arms control proposal by the Soviet side represents no historic breakthrough but rather is consistent with their general disarmament proposals, that date back to Lenin's time-- raises several questions about Gorbachev's arms control agenda: Are the Soviets serious about all this in the sense that they would be willing to negotiate in detail, agree on, and implement the propositions they have advanced if their own terms are accepted? What motives and calculations underly the advancement of so radical an agenda? Are there shades or degrees of seriousness depending on the issues or future contingencies? [redacted]

69. The evidence and broad logic of the situation allow for three alternative answers.

--The Gorbachev regime may be largely serious about this radical agenda because it believes that achieving it would a) bring about a sharp diminution of the overall East-West military competition and permit concentration of Soviet resources on economic modernization, but at the

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same time b) allow keeping some of the military bases of Soviet superpower status intact (modernized conventional forces) and permit other forms of Soviet power projection in the world.

- The Soviets are not serious at all about their radical arms control agenda except as a means to attain short- and medium- term political goals. Actually implementing it would be too wrenching with regard to their own military doctrines and structures, and implausible with regard to verification, detailed negotiations, third countries, future technology, etc.
- They are very serious about their political goals in advancing this agenda. But the present political state of the US-Soviet relationship makes it unnecessary and undesirable to decide one way or other about the seriousness of specific propositions being advanced. Rather they expect that the present interaction over radical arms control and the surrounding politics will create a new political situation--possibly before, possibly after the next US elections--in which they will decide what they want to pursue in practical arms negotiations probably on a less radical agenda. In the meantime, they will play a largely political and propaganda game.

70. For the present, the third is the best answer. In any case, the evidence does not allow us to take Soviet seriousness about Moscow's own proposals at face value. There is a clearly manipulative dimension to Soviet arms control policy and to Soviet foreign policy as a whole in the present period.

--Across the board, Gorbachev has been seeking to revitalize the effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy through activism and bold tactics after a period of near paralysis. This has involved outright deception on occasion (as in the sham withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan). In no area, however, has a fundamental change of Soviet objectives yet been observed.

--Soviet management of the Reykjavik meeting indicates that it was artfully, if hurriedly, contrived to put maximum psychological and public pressure on the President, either to accept Soviet terms for a breakthrough or to suffer a costly "failure."

71. What is Gorbachev trying to do? He has two urgent objectives:

--First and most specifically, he is trying to stop the SDI program through a combination of formal agreement and the political side-effects which may be expected from the manner in which SDI is debated. Because the Soviets respect American technological prowess once mobilized, SDI presents a costly and frightening strategic uncertainty for Soviet military and economic planning likely to dominate the next two decades if it is not stopped. The longer it goes on the more likely it is to become "institutionalized" in terms of

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budgets, technology momentum, and constituencies. It is still politically vulnerable, however, because of great cost, technological uncertainty, and conflict with "conventional" arms control thinking. Gorbachev is trying to maximize and exploit those vulnerabilities by seeking to depict SDI as the major obstacle to bilateral arms control breakthroughs. He almost certainly calculates that, should the US accept this depiction and, even in principle, declare SDI forfeit for major arms control progress, political support for the program will erode or can be kept limited in the years ahead. Moreover, this political effect will set in as soon as SDI is put on the block of negotiations, while the fine print of other issues could be negotiated for years without or before agreement.

--Second and more generally, Gorbachev is seeking to use the prospect of far-reaching arms control breakthroughs to deflect the Reagan Administration from its entire national security agenda of arms buildup and counter-Soviet actions, or, failing this, to create a political climate in which the Administration cannot act effectively on that agenda and cannot perpetuate it into a successor Administration because this agenda led to "mismanagement" of the US-Soviet relationship.

72. Whatever they think about the military implications of specific arms control concepts or proposals, the Soviets are clearly and, for the moment, primarily playing a political game about which they are very serious. Achievement of the two objectives stated above would make the 1990s much easier for the USSR than they would otherwise be. They would facilitate the reconciliation of Soviet internal economic and social modernization with continued and possibly expanded Soviet roles as an international superpower.

73. While he plays his political game, Gorbachev has a strong political interest in assuring that he has the confidence of his own military leadership. Present evidence suggests that he has it, despite insinuations for external effect by Soviet spokesmen that there is military opposition to such gambits as the unilateral test moratorium. Gorbachev took Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev to Reykjavik to both play the game for credibility with US participants and to assure the Soviet military establishment that the game was in competent professional hands, whatever it might lead to. For those in the Soviet system not fully read into leadership political calculations, the agenda of radical arms control may well produce a certain queasiness and apprehension. But it is extremely unlikely that Gorbachev could or would venture his radical initiatives without support for their tactical logic in the Politburo and in the top military leadership. His references to the Soviet leadership and the presence of Akhromeyev at Reykjavik indicate that this is an important requirement and that it is being met.

74. At the same time, there is an underlying logic of evolving Soviet strategic doctrine which supports Gorbachev in his radical arms control agenda for political and, eventually, some military purposes.

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75. First, Soviet military and political leaders concerned about the future of Soviet military power--which means the entire Soviet leadership--will appreciate that Soviet strategic interests will be served if Gorbachev succeeds in his main objectives, stopping SDI and muting the overall competitiveness of the US adversary. They all have an interest in recreating an East-West environment of detente in which the Soviets can pursue established or new strategic objectives at their own pace, retain the initiative if not a monopoly on strategic defense developments, and reconcile more easily the objectives of economic and military modernization which could clash sharply in the next several five year plans. [redacted]

76. Second, as revealed by the writings of Marshal Ogarkov and other military authorities, Soviet military planners are grappling--as yet inconclusively we believe--with a proposed evolution of Soviet military doctrine in which there is some shift of emphasis away from nuclear forces toward more proficient nonnuclear forces exploiting new technologies and operational concepts. This evolution is inspired in part by a recognition that extensive use of nuclear weapons in war would very likely lead to such destruction of military forces, particularly land combat forces, that coherent operations for tangible military objectives might not be possible. This might occur even if mutual deterrence, counterforce operations, or strategic defense measures somehow protected the Soviet homeland from destruction. Soviet planners are also mindful that new nonnuclear technologies--for precise attack, battle management, and area effects--offer the possibility that nonnuclear maneuver and strike forces can be employed to strategic effect where hitherto only nuclear weapons seemed suitable. Not only are such nonnuclear approaches attractive to Soviet planners for strategic (usable warfighting power) and institutional (the power of the ground forces) reasons, they believe that they are working their way into Western military practice anyway; the USSR must strive to get ahead of an inexorable, but costly and technologically demanding, objective process. [redacted]

77. It is unclear whether this doctrinal evolution, to the extent it is being implemented as opposed to merely being discussed, has led top Soviet military leaders to accede to arms control approaches that facilitate some reduction of the weight of nuclear weapons and forces in the overall strategic environment. The Gorbachev agenda of radical arms control is not a program for achieving such a reduction directly and mechanically. Neither the Soviet military nor political leaderships believe in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They may not take any of the lesser goals on Gorbachev's agenda seriously as concrete goals, at least for the present. The whole campaign, however, does tend to create an international political environment in which it may be easier to use arms control to facilitate the attainment of Soviet military, as well as political, objectives.

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- The erosion of the peacetime legitimacy and credibility of NATO nuclear doctrines, commitments, and programs.
- The slowing down of all the military programs of NATO countries.
- A reduced likelihood that, in the event of an East-West conflict, the US and NATO would have the political consensus or the requisite nuclear fire power to threaten or execute a credible, i.e., militarily effective, tolerable, and repeatable, escalation to nuclear use.

78. In the eyes of the Soviet military planner the actual likelihood of arms control eliminating nuclear weapons, all strategic forces, or whole classes of weapons is probably so small as to be practically zero. But the Gorbachev campaign surrounding radical arms control could well promote effects such as those above--with or without agreements--and Soviet military power would gain therefrom.

#### Soviet Risk-Taking Propensities

79. The Soviets most likely assess that the Warsaw Pact has sufficient conventional ground forces to meet their planning requirements for the ground operation of their overall theater operation plan. And even without ballistic missiles, the Soviets would maintain an advantage in theater nuclear assets. However, the Soviets also probably assess that the Warsaw Pact has insufficient air assets to meet their planning requirements for either the initial Air Operation--whose success they consider critical to the overall theater operation--or to adequately support Pact ground force operations.

80. There will probably be no change in Soviet objectives toward areas contiguous to the Warsaw Pact or elsewhere. However, as the defense of Western Europe has traditionally been coupled with US strategic forces comprised primarily of ballistic missiles and their associated warheads--the Soviets may pursue more vigorously the coercive power flowing from their conventional force superiority. Soviet actions elsewhere will continue to be based on achieving specific aims and influenced by regional political/military factors, as well as the strategic East-West relationship.

81. Currently, US ballistic missiles are the principal component of extended deterrence, and their elimination would substantially reduce NATO's nuclear deterrent. However, not all nuclear weapons would be eliminated under the proposal and the threat of a nuclear attack in response to a conventional attack against NATO would continue to have some deterrent value in crisis situations. While it is unclear whether in a zero ballistic missile world the risk of escalation from conventional to nuclear war would decrease, the likelihood of crises and even conventional conflict, however, could increase. (Nonetheless, war itself--even a conventional war--remains unlikely.) Overall, the elimination of ballistic missiles could reduce somewhat political stability, by increasing Soviet propensity for risk-taking.

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since the Soviets might judge that the probability and potency of any US response would likely be decreased in a world without ballistic missiles.

THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES

The NATO Allies

82. Key NATO allies, especially the nuclear powers, will spare no effort in opposing the elimination of US and Soviet ballistic missiles on the grounds that it will undermine the concept of nuclear deterrence and NATO's Flexible Response doctrine, lead inexorably toward a weakened US commitment to the defense of Western Europe and require additional military efforts on their part to redress the conventional imbalance.

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China

96. A zero-zero ballistic missile agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would be cause for concern in Beijing--despite its longstanding call for the abolition of nuclear weapons. China would expect to come under great international pressure to accede to any US-Soviet treaty, and they would not want to be perceived internationally as dragging their feet on an historic opportunity for sharp cuts in nuclear arms. At the same time, compliance with an agreement that eliminated ballistic missiles while allowing strategic defenses and nonballistic offensive systems would nullify China's deterrent, which relies exclusively on ballistic missiles than can threaten the Soviet Union. As a result, we believe Beijing would at a minimum attempt to retain its present nuclear capability and pursue a political strategy designed to deflect international pressures to sign on.

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97. China, moreover, would be particularly concerned about the failure of such an agreement to abolish all types of nuclear weapons and to restrict strategic defenses. With a limited bomber force, cruise missile capability, and early warning system, and with the elimination of its own ballistic missile force, the Chinese would be unable to respond in kind to a Soviet cruise missile or bomber strike. China would also lose its even more limited ability to target the United States. [redacted]

98. Another concern would be verification, although Beijing has not made an issue of this in the past and is in a particularly good position--given its experience with camouflage--to hide ballistic missile deployments. Nonetheless, China has very little verification capability, and would have to trust the United States and the Soviet Union to monitor compliance. [redacted]

99. Compounding all this is China's distrust of India, which is nuclear capable and probably would be unaffected by the agreement. Tensions along their disputed border are high at present and subject to periodic flare-ups. [redacted]

101. In our view, in addition to pursuing its current plans Beijing has three broad military strategies from which to choose in responding to a US-Soviet agreement. None are satisfactory from China's point of view, in our opinion, and all would be combined with a vigorous diplomatic campaign designed to deflect pressures to accede to the agreement. Each of the strategies has the drawback of requiring Beijing to reallocate funds to nuclear development at a time when--ironically--reliable intelligence indicates China has been cutting back on nuclear weapons programs and wants to contain military spending to devote more resources to economic development. [redacted]

102. China's first military option would be to redirect research funds into strategic bombers and cruise missile development. In addition to being expensive, China would find itself attempting to overcome a 25-year gap in these military technologies. We believe China is at least ten years away from developing nuclear artillery, and while short-range (90 km) cruise missiles developed from China's Styx-type anti-ship missile are a possibility in the next few years, neither it nor the artillery provide the second strike deterrent China believes is essential for its security. [redacted]

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103. In our judgment, China might combine the above activity with dismantlement of existing silos and bases and a secret attempt to speed up deployment of a mobile IRBM with a range of about 5000 km. If deployed at secret bases in western China, it would be able to reach Moscow. We believe Beijing could probably cut deployment time for such a system to five or six years, but probably realizes it would be difficult to keep secret. Discovery, moreover, would set back key foreign policy goals. [redacted]

104. Less likely would be Beijing's second broad option--rejecting an agreement outright and attempt to overcome an unrestrained Soviet ballistic missile defense by sheer numbers of warheads. With an all-out effort, China probably could double the size of the force we project as likely by the mid-1990s, but only by sacrificing economic development and modernization of its conventional forces. Even then, the cost of building a strategic missile force large enough to overwhelm an expanded Soviet ballistic missile defense--protecting Moscow and other major Soviet population centers--not constrained by the ABM treaty--would be prohibitive. [redacted]

105. We judge China's least likely option is full compliance with the agreement. China would have great difficulty constructing an effective nuclear deterrent before 1996 that did not rely on ballistic missiles. Penetrating bombers with sophisticated electronic countermeasures or stealth technology, long-range cruise missiles with terrain-following radar, or alternative weapons will be beyond Beijing's technological capability for at least the next ten years. Similarly, Beijing would have scant prospects for building an effective strategic defense system. [redacted]

106. Whatever China decides to do with its nuclear forces, we believe it will launch a diplomatic offensive designed to deflect international pressure to sign on and play to third-world audiences. We believe Beijing would likely call for additional steps by the superpowers before other nations can sign on because of the continued overwhelming US and Soviet nuclear superiority. Although we believe it less likely because it would cast China in a negative light, Beijing could even choose to portray a US-Soviet agreement as a superpower hoax designed to prevent other nations from achieving equality and guaranteeing their security, much as it treats the nuclear test ban treaty. [redacted]

#### Nth Countries

107. It is difficult to gauge how other nations, who either may possess, have under development, or might develop, nuclear weapons would react to a US-Soviet zero ballistic missile world. It is unlikely, nevertheless, that a US-Soviet agreement would in any way curtail or otherwise slow such programs down. Nor would such an agreement act as a stimulus to a buildup in nuclear capabilities. These countries are developing nuclear capabilities primarily for regional purposes, not to threaten the two superpowers. Moreover, by 1996 none would be capable of deploying more than a few long-range ballistic missiles. [redacted]

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119. Direct threats to the US by ballistic missile attack from Nth world countries in the next 10 years would be minimal at best. Any long range threat that could be developed would likely come from countries such as ~~Iran, Iraq, Libya, and~~ who, if successful in their attempts to develop large SLVs, could certainly develop intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missiles. Instead, threats to US forces and interests by ballistic missile attack are more likely on a regional basis during the next 10 years; e.g., US forces deployed in South Korea or to British forces deployed to the Falkland Islands.

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